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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
Spontaneous Anonymous Group Cryptography and its Applications 
Submitted by F U N G Kar-Yin 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in June 2004 
In the rapid advancement of advanced technology, many commercial 
applications have been launched to provide services in the Internet. 
For years, people enjoy fast transmission of information on the net-
works, and now they pay more attention on security problems. In 
most traditional cryptography, information security is usually limited 
to communications between two entities. As the world is revolving, the 
issue focuses on multiple number of groups instead of two individuals. 
A n interesting question may be raised up: 
Can an indwdual identity m the group be protected? 
Spontaneous anonymous group (SAG) cryptography is a new paradigm 
in which any entity can conscript n - 1 diversion members and gener-
ate a ciphertext or a signature. These members are unaware of their 
participation in the process. No setup stage or presharing process is 
needed. No group manager is present at any stage so that no party can 
revoke the identity. Such property is named as spontaneity. Uncondi-
i 
tional protection on privacy is provided as either insider or outsider is 
unable to find out the real generator. 
Blind signature is an interactive protocol between two parties, namely 
signer and user, in which no information about the message has been 
revealed by the signer. In this report, a generic framework of blind 
S A G signatures is proposed. W e propose two 1-out-of-n schemes based 
on any existing major blind signatures. A n extension to 力-out-of-n 
(threshold) blind S A G signature is also presented in this paper. It 
provides a solution to solve privacy problem such that none can find 
out a real signer while the signer is unable to link its signature to the 
message. More interestingly, the signer is failed to point out whether 
a given message-signature pair is signed by itself or not. 
In attaining the results, a general introduction and security model 
of blind signature and S A G cryptography are studied, and thus a brief 
description of terminologies is presented. Finally, an overview of blind 
S A G signature applications is shortly given. 
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Crytogmphy is a study of mathemactical techniques related 
to aspects of information security such as confidentiality, 
data integrity’ entity authentication, and data origin authen-
tication [49]. 
1.1 Development of Cryptography 
Cryptography probably dates back as far as 2000 B C in 
Egypt in where ancient Egyptians first used a derivation of 
the standard hieroglyphics of the day to communicate, or 
decorated the tombs of deceased rulers and kings. From ini-
tial and limited use in ancient times, to the twentieth century 
where it played a crucial role in the outcome of both world 
wars. The practitioners of the art were those related to the 
military, the diplomatic service and government in general. 
A rapid growth in computers and communications systems 
since 1960s brought with it a demand from the private sector 
for means to protect information in digital form and to pro-
vide security services. Beginning with the work of Feistel in 
the early 1970s and culminating in 1977 with the adoption 
as a U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard for en-
1 
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crypting unclassified information, the Data Encryption Stan-
dard(DES) [51，52], is the most well-known cryptographic 
mechanism in history. 
The most striking development came in 1976 when Diffie 
and Hellman published New Directions m Cryptography [28 . 
This paper introduced a revolutionary concept of puhlic-key 
cryptography and also provided a new and ingenious method 
for key exchange based on the intractability of discrete log-
arithm over a finite field. In 1978, Rivest, Shamir and Adle-
men [63] suggested a practical public-key encryption and sig-
nature, now referred to as RSA. Another class of powerful 
and practical public-key schemes was found by El Gamal 
30] in 1984. 
Over the century, an elaborate set of protocols and mech-
anisms has been created to deal with information security 
issues when the information is conveyed by physical doc-
uments. Often the objectives of information security are 
not only achieved through mathematical algorithms and pro-
tocols, but procedural techniques and abidance of laws to 
achieve the desired result. One of the fundamental tools 
used in information security is the signature. It is a building 
block for many services such as non-repudiation, data ori-
gin authentication, identification, and witnessing, and many 
othera. The signature is intended to be unique to the in-
dividual and serve as a means to identify, authorize, and 
validate. 
Four Paradigms 
Of all the information security objectives, there are four 
paradigms: 
1. Symmetric Key Encryption: a classical cryptography. 
T w o parties, namely sender and receiver, are sharing the 
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same secret keys. Efficient computations enable its wide 
deployment in low computing devices, such as handsets. 
2. Hybrid System: symmetric and asymmetric encryption 
are used interchangeably for various commercial appli-
cations. 
3. Certificate: By a digital certificate, the holder of a public 
key can show its ownership in a more reliable and sys-
tematic way. Secure Socket Layer, SSL, distributes the 
public key by a certificate. 
4. Multi-cert multi-app: it is for complicated applications 
which involve many parties. 
1.2 Group Cryptography 
Most of the fundamental public key cryptography algorithms 
or protocols only consist of two parties, such as a sender and 
a receiver in an encryption, a prover and a verifier in an 
identification, or a signer and a prover in a signature. Those 
that involve a group of n entities with certain properties are 
called Group Cryptography. 
There are three main paradigms in group cryptography that 
we focus on： 
1. Involvement of Trusted Third Party (TTP) A T T P , can 
be a group manager or a clerk, may be needed inside 
a system in order to provide certain security, such as 
unforgeability, confidentiality or anonymity. 
2. Group Secret Sharing or Key Distribution Round A se-
cret sharing [68] is an algorithm of recovering a pre-
shared secret hy t of n entities. Some group cryptogra-
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phy primitives make good use of this algorithm to share 
their secret among n persons in a pre-processing stage. 
3. Spontaneity A group cryptography is said to be sponta-
neous if neither trusted party nor setup stage is needed. 
Diversion members are unaware of their participation in 
the signing or encryption algorithm. 
1.3 Spontaneous Anonymous Group Sig-
nature 
Unlike traditional group cryptography, a preprocessing stage 
or key distribution is needed in SAG. In some earlier work, 
group cryptography can be achieved by secret sharing where 
usually a T T P is present in the setup stage. Later, T T P can 
be replaced by a group secret generated by collaborations of 
n persons. Though both can maintain anonymity in front of 
the outsiders, members inside the group or the manager can 
revoke the identity of ciphertext's or signature's maker. 
Spontaneous Anonymous Group (SAG) signature, on the 
other hand, is a novel paradigm of creating a signature on 
behalf of a group of users without any group secret or setup 
stage. It possesses two key features: spontaneity and signer-
ambiguity. 
1. Spontaneity No trusted third party or group manager 
gets involved in any preprocessing stage. A n entity can 
specify a set of entities arbitrarily including itself to gen-
erate a signature by using their public keys and its pri-
vate key. 
2. Signer-ambiguity Parties other than the actual signer 
are unaware of their participation in the signature. Anonymity 
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in S A G signature is unconditional (information-theoretic), 
irrevocable and exculpable. The term, signer-ambiguity 
denotes the property of privacy granted to the schemes 
so that verifiers can figure out the signer no better than 
wild guess. 
1.4 Bl ind Signature 
Blind Signature is a protocol between two parties, a signer 
and a user, in which the signer gains no knowledge about 
the message. W h e n given any two message-signature pairs, 
the signer has no idea on the order of which they are signed. 
In most digital signature schemes, signer always knows what 
it has signed. Contrarily, sometimes user may want to get 
a signature but the content is kept secret from the signer. 
Hence, it is impossible for the signer to associate the message-
signature pair afterwards. 
The concept of blind signature can be illustrated by an exam-
ple originated in [17] from the real world. The signer signs on 
a paper covered with a carbon paper lined with an envelope. 
Writing a signature on the envelope produces a signature on 
the paper covering the content. 
The blind signature is particularly useful in e-commerce ap-
plications which are privacy sensitive. For example, well-
known applications such as electronic cash (e-cash) and elec-
tronic voting (e-voting) are built on the top of the blind 
signature. 
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1.5 Bl ind SAG Signature 
The notion of blind S A G signature is introduced in this the-
sis. W e provide a modular construction in which any prov-
ably secure blind signature schemes can be plugged into any 
S A G signature. A blind S A G signature allows any user to 
select a n legitimate signers and to interact with t signers to 
generate a signature. All except the user obtain no informa-
tion about the list of signers and the message. 
The framework and its properties of the signatures were first 
given by Chan et. al. [16] in ESAS 2004, and the work 
therein is the major contribution in this thesis. Ad-hoc and 
sensor networks are characterized by their dynamic struc-
ture, lacking of a pre-established fixed infrastructure, and 
constrained resources. Being featured with adaptive group 
formation and spontaneity, blind S A G signature suits for A d 
Hoc applications development. 
1.6 Organization of This Thesis 
W e will present the mathematical backgrounds, preliminary 
primitives and models deployed in cryptography in chapter 
2. Then details in blind and S A G signatures which include 
literature review, properties, security requirements and their 
applications are given in chapter 3 and 4 respectively. Our 
major result, blind S A G signature, is delivered in chapter 5. 
In chapter 6, we will discuss open problems and conclusion. 
Chapter 2 
Background Study 
Modern cryptography deals with aspects of secure messaging, 
authentications, signatures, e-cash and e-voting. Recently, 
privacy and threshold cryptosystem are popular topics. The 
prior property captures the importance of anonymity when 
using electronic communications. Threshold, which means a 
division among a number of users, is crucial in our modern 
society since most of the applications are not initiated by a 
single party. For example, in a contract signing, more than 
one signers are participated in order to make the contract 
valid. 
In this chapter, we may go through cryptographic primi-
tives, mathematical backgrounds, and brief study in some 
paradigms and security models. 
2.1 Six Primitives in Cryptography 
Here is the introduction of the modern cryptography which 
is composed of six primitives. 
7 
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2.1.1 Symmetric Encryption 
In a symmetric encryption scheme, the encryption key and 
the decryption key are the same, named as secret key. It is 
preshared by sender and receiver. 
Ek{m) = c (2.1) 
Dk{c)=m (2.2) 
D k { E k { m ) ) = m (2.3) 
where, m is the message, c is the ciphertext and k is the 
key. Ek is the encryption function and Dk is the decryption 
function. 
Symmetric encryption is divided into block cipher and stream 
cipher. D E S [51, 52] a typical example of block cipher where 
R C 4 [61] is a commonly known stream cipher, typified by its 
use in wireless LAN. 
2.1.2 Asymmetric Encryption 
Encryption key(public key) and decryption key(private key) 
in an asymmetric encryption algorithms are different, unlike 
previous encryption. It is also known as public key encryp-
tion, such as El Gamal Encryption. Throughout this thesis, 
PK specifies the public key which is publicly known and SK 
denotes the private key kept by its owner. 
EpKim) = c (2.4) 
Dsk^c) = m (2.5) 
D s K { E p K { m ) ) = m (2.6) 
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2.1.3 Digital Signature 
One of the fundamental primitives for authentication, autho-
rization, and non-repudiation is digital signature. Its pur-
pose is to provide a means for an entity to bind its identity 
to a piece of information. It is mostly created by asymmetric 
encryption. O n input a private key and message, the entity 
produces a signature. A verifier can check its validity by 
using its corresponding public key. 
It should have the following properties: 
1. Authentic Signature is generated by the signer. 
2. Unforgeable Signature cannot be created by anyone 
else except the signer 
3. Unalterable After the signature is made on the doc-
ument, the signer cannot alter the contents of message 
and the signature. 
4. Non-repudiable Signer cannot deny having signed a 
signature once it did this. 
5. Non-reusable A signature and message is paired up 
after completion, the signature cannot be used in another 
message. 
2.1.4 Hash Function 
A hash function is an one-way function (more in sec. 2.3). 
Given a variable length input x, it is easy to compute its a 
fixed length output H(x). But the inverse of this function is 
hard. It is important that hash function is collision-resistant, 
i.e. it is hard to find x,y s.t. s • y, H{x) = H{y、. SHA-I 
and M D 5 are common examples of hash function. 
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2.1.5 Digital Certificate 
Digital certificate is part of a person's identity card in elec-
tronic world. It contains public key, information of the key 
owner as well as the certificate authority. Anyone can verify 
the certificate by asking a certificate authority. Certificate 
authority (CA) is usually a public trustworthy organizations, 
such as Verisign, Microsoft or VISA. 
2.1.6 Proof of Knowledge 
Proof of Knowledge(PoK) is an interactive protocol between 
two parties, a prover (P) and a verifier {V) such that V is 
convinced that P is owning the knowledge of a witness. In 
cryptography, it is important that no information about the 
witness can be extracted by V. 
Definition 2.1.1. Let R C {0,1}* x {0,1}* be a polynomially 
bounded binary relation and let L be the language defined by 
R. An interactive proof of knowledge is a protocol (P, V) that 
has the following properties: 
On common input to P and V, x, 
1. Completeness: 
Pr [ (P , V){x) = accept|x e L] > e, (2.7) 
where e G 1 . 
2. Soundness: 
Pr [ (P , V){x) = acceptlx ^ L] < 5, (2.8) 
where 5 £ [0, 
Three-move type is commonly used PoK. There are three 
rounds: commitment(7^), challenge(C) and response(cS). IZ is 
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a random value committed by P. Then V sends a random 
challenge C to P and accepts if P can return a valid response 
S. It has an additional property, special soundness. Without 
SK, it is a hard problem to complete PoK. This usually 
means that answering two randomly generated challenges for 
a given commitment resuls in witness extraction (or soluation 
of a candidate hard problem). 
Transcript of PoK can be simulated by giving C and S to 
get back TZ. The two transcripts from simulation and the 
protocol are statistically indisguishable. W e generally adopt 
three-move PoK (E-protocol) throughout our thesis. 
2,2 Euler Totient Function 
Euler Totient Function if is defined by 
1. For a prime p and a > 1, 二 — 1) 
2. For integers m, n, with gcd{m, n) = 1, (p{mn) = ip{n)(p{m). 
For any integer, n s.t.n = " ' pT where < i < k 
is prime, 
M 二 • (2.9) 
二 囊 倾 ” .1〔pt” (2.10) 
k 
二 H p ' r i f e - l ) (2-11) 
ip{n) also represents the number of positive integers smaller 
than n relatively prime to n. By Fermat Little Theorem, if p 
is prime, m”—丄三 1 mod p, for all integers m, gcd{p, m) = 1. 
It can be generalized to: if gcd{m, n), then my、几、三 1 m o d n. 
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2.3 One-Way Function 
One-way function is the most basic primitive that is easy to 
compute and hard to invert. Easy means that the function 
can be computed by a probabilistic polynomial time algo-
rithm with non-negligible probability, while hard means that 
any probabilistic polynomial algorithm attempting to com-
pute is with negligible probability. 
Definition 2.3.1. u is negligible if for every constant c > 0； 
there exists an integer kc such that u{k) < k—。for all k < kc. 
The success probability is said to be negligible if as a func-
tion of the input length the probability is bounded by any 
polynomial function. 
Definition 2.3.2 (One-way function). A function f : 
{0,1}* 一 {0,1}* IS one-way if 
1. there exists a PPT that on input x outputs f{x); 
2. For every PPT algorithm A there is a negligible function 
t^a such that for sufficiently large k, 
PT [f{z) 1产’ y — /⑷；z — ")] < "a ⑷ 
(2.12) 
One-way function that requires all but a negligible fraction of 
input X is hard to invert. In eq.( 2.12), it is probabilistic. A n 
adversary A, can invert the function with a very low proba-
bility with the probability distribution of function taking in 
X, where x is of the length k, and the possible coin tosses of 
A. X is chosen randomly and y = f{x). 
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2.3.1 One-Way Trapdoor Function 
A trapdoor function / is a one-way function with an extra 
secret function that allows a possessor to efficiently invert 
f at any point in the domain of his choosing. It is easy to 
compute f on any point but infeasible to invert the function 
without the knowledge of the inverse function. It should be 
easy to generate a matched pair of trapdoor function and its 
inverse function. Besides, publication of f should not give 
any information about the inverse function on any point. 
Definition 2.3.3 (One-way Trap-door function). A trap-
door function is a one-way function f : {0,1}* 一 {0,1}* 
such that there exists a polynomial p and a probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithm I such that for every k there exists 
an tk G {0,1}*, where \tk\ < p{k), and for all x G {0,1}*； 
I 糊,h) 二 y s.t.则二淋 
The existence of one-way and one-way trapdoor functions is 
still unknown but there is a number of candidates. They 
are essential for the public key cryptography. For detailed 
description, see [36, 49 . 
2.3.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem 
A group G is cyclic if and only if there is an element g G G 
s.t. for every a G G, there is an integer i s.t. g'^ 二 a. g is 
called generator or primitive element of G. W h e n G = Z*, 
the order of generator g is q which means the least positive 
integer s.t. g^ = 1 mod p. 
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is defined informally as 
follows: given a prime p, a generator g of Z* and an element 
y, find an integer x s.t. g工=y mod p. 
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Definition 2.3.4 (Discrete Logarithm Problem). For 
every polynomial Q and every PPT A, for all sufficiently 
large k, 
Pr[A{p, q,g) = X s.t. y 三 g工 m o d p where 1 < x < p—l] < Q⑷ 
(2.13) 
D L P is assumed to be computationally infeasible by any 
polynomial time algorithm. Many cryptographic techniqures 
rely on the intractability of D L P in multiplicative group Z*. 
For example, Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Agreement, El 
Gamal encryption and signature. For more details in appli-
cations of it, see [49 • 
In [49], a generalized D L P is defined as: given a finite cyclic 
group G of order q, a generator g and a value y) find discrete 
logarithm of y base g. Most cryptograhic applications are 
interested in the multiplicative group of Z*, including par-
ticular case in Z^g, where sq is an integer. Other groups, Z*, 
where n is a composite, the additive group of points on an 
elliptic curve defined over a finite field。 
2.3.3 RSA Problem 
Trapdoor function, R S A [63] was proposed by Rivest, Shamir 
and Adlemen. 
Let n = pqhe di product of two distinct large primes, p and q, 
and let e be the integer s.t. gcd{e, ^ {n)) 二 1. R S A funciton, 
/n,e is 
/n，e⑷=OC^ m o d n (2.14) 
/厂…e is easy to compute but difficult to invert. The trapdoor 
information is a unique integer, d where ed 三 1 mod Lp{n). 
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R S A problem is assumed to be a hard problem that it is dif-
ficult to obtain information, x when n, e, x^ mod n are given. 
Definition 2.3.5 (RSA Problem). Let n = pq, where p, q 
are primes and \p\ = \q\ = k. For every polynomial Q and 
every Polynomial Time Machine，A^ there exists an integer 
ko such that V/c > /cq. 
2.3.4 Integer Factorization Problem 
Many cryptographic techniques and protocols are built on 
the intractability of integer factorization problem, some ex-
amples are R S A public-key encryption schemes, R S A signa-
ture schemes and Rabin public-key encryption schemes. 
Definition 2.3.6 (Integer Factorization Problem). Given 
a positive integer, n, find its prime factorization，i.e. n 二 
T~Tk e,. \ -i 
There are numerous algorithms trying to solve the problem. 
The best running time, Dixon's random squares algorithms, 
is Oi^e^ogriiogiogny The recommended size for n today is 
1024 bits. 
2.3.5 Quadratic Residuosity Problem 
Definition 2.3.7 (Quadratic Residuosity Problem). Given 
an odd integer n s.t. n 二 and q are odd primes, decide 
whether a ^ Jn is quadratic residue modulo n. 
The trapdoor information is p and q. a is quadratic residue 
modulo n if and only if a is quadratic residue modulo p and 
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modulo q. However, if the factorization of n is unknown, 
then no efficient algorithm is known for solving this problem. 
The probability of guess is no greater than 1/2 + Q(k) for 
polynomial Q and security parameter k. 
2.3.6 Schnorr's ROS assumption 
Schnorr [66] presented a new algorithm to compute the par-
allel one-more forgery of Schnorr (resp. Okamoto-Schnorr) 
blind signatures [？, PointchevalSt96a,Schnorr01] He showed 
the equivalence of the parallel one-more unforgery of those 
two blind signatures and the R O S Problem, in the random or-
acle model [7] plus the generic group model [53]. His techique 
also applied to many other blind signatures. 
Definition 2.3.8 (ROS Assumption). Given 1 < < 
qH，typically qb << Qh, cmd all computations are in Zq. 
Compute a Qh X Qb matrix A, such that the probability of 
computing the following problem is non-negligible: 
Given random c = [ci, • • • , fig丑]，compute J C {1, • • • , qn} 
with = Qb H- 1； jo 6 J’ {(y^j ： j G J } with 
a^Q + 0, and [3 such that Cj] == (3 and 
{Aj : j G J \ {jo}} o/re linearly independent. 
Note Aj denote the j-th row vectors of A，and [Aj, Cj] de-
notes the lengthened vector by one more entry Cj. 
2.4 Bilinear Pairing 
Cryptographic bilinear pairing(map) is originated from two 
attacks based on Weil Pairing [50, 48] and Tate Pairing [33 
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on some ”weak” elliptic curves. T w o attacks in [48, 33] re-
duced the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem polyno-
mially to D L P in which index calculus in finite field can 
solve discrete logarithm in subexponential time. Joux [40 
proposed a one-round protocol by using bilinear maps and 
resulted a number of primitives [8, 11, 75, 9, 10] derived 
from bilinear map. His work inspired many researchers to 
build new efficient cryptographic primitives based on bilin-
ear maps: ID-based encryption [10], short signatures [12], 
ring signature [75], blind signature [8] and etc. It is worth of 
going through the basic concepts of bilinear map for better 
understanding in the upcoming sections. 
Paper written by Menezes et.al. [48]，which is named as 
M O V attack, were using weil pairing [50] while Frey et.al. 
33] published another attack (FR) which used tate pairing. 
Menezes et. al. showed that weil pairing can reduce the D L P 
in subexponential time in supersingular elliptic curves. Ha-
rasawa et.al [37] extended the algorithm to non-singular. O n 
the other hand, F R held on the conditions which M O V did. 
In [37], authors compared two algorithms and concluded that 
F R can be applied in more curves and be more practical. 
Definition 2.4.1 (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm 
Problem). Let elliptic curve E over a finite field Fq and 
P be a point on E with order q. Given a point on E, R, 
for every polynormal Q and every PPT A, for all sufficiently 
large k, 
1 1 
Pr[A{E, P,R) =x s.t. R 二 xP where 0 < x < q-1] < ^ ^ 
(2.16) 
Definition 2.4.2 (Bilinear Map). Let Gi, G2 be an ad-
ditive group of prime order q and G3 be the multiplicative 
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group. Suppose, P G Gi and Q G G2, there exists a mapping 
e s.t. 
e : G i X G2 -> G3 (2.17) 
e IS a bilinear map if it satisfies the following properties: 
1. (biUneanty): e(aP, bQ) = e(P, QY\ for a^beZ^ 
2. (non-degeneracy): If P e Gi, then e(P, O) = 1. If 
e(P, Q) 二 1 for all Q G G2, then P 二 •，where O is 
the point of infinity. 
2.4.1 Weil Pairing 
Menenzes et. al. in [48] achieved the reduction by establish-
ing an isomorphism mapping from a subgroup generated by 
P in Fq to a subgroup of nth roots of unity in < 6. 
It is denoted that n is the order of P. A n-torsion point P 
is a point satisfying nP 二 O. Let E[n] be n-torsion (addi-
tive) group and jin be the multiplicative group of nth roots 
of unity. 
A bilinear map in weil pairing is defined as 
e : E[n] X E[n] -> [in- (2.18) 
Point R, P are on the curve E, say i? = A P in an additive 
group over F^ can be mapped to a multiplicative group over 
Fqk by e as 
(2.19) 
2.4.2 Tate Pairing 
Bilinear pairing for reduction in [33] is operated on the divi-
sor class to solve the problem in the finite field Ff, where k 
is small. They showed that the pairing on Abelian varieties 
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in Lichtenbaum's version can be used to related the discrete 
logarithm in group of n-torsion points of the Mordell-Weil 
group of the Jacobian J of a curve over a finite field. 
There exists a prime n s.t. qk 三 1 m o d n. The bilinear 
pairing is defined as 
e : E[n] X E[n]/nE[n]—〜 (2.20) 
To gain more details in elliptic curve and two pairing algo-
rithms, read [50, 70’ 48，33, 37:. 
2.5 Gap DifRe-Hellman Group 
Gap DifRe-Hellman and its properties are useful in many 
applications, and bilinear pairing is one of the G D H groups. 
W e will briefly present the definitions, for more details, see 
12’ 11, 41；. 
2.5.1 GDH 
Let Gi, G2 be two groups of the same prime order q. W e 
view Gi as an additive group and G2 as a multiplicative 
group. Let P be an arbitrary generator of Gi . Assume that 
(DLP) is hard in both groups. A mapping e : Gj G2 
satisfying the following properties is called a bilinear map 
from a cryptographic point of view. 
Definition 2.5.1 (Computational DifRe-Hellman Prob-
lem (CDH)). Let P he a point m a group Gi with order q. 
Informally, CDH is the problem to compute abP where P, aP 
and bP are given, where a, b G Z*. For any polynomial Q 
and every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, for all 
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sufficient large k, the advantage, Adv^DHj ts: 
AdvCD% 二 Pr[A{P, aP, = : 0 “ 6 < 卜 1] 
(2.21) 
Definition 2.5.2 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem 
(DDH)). Let P be a point m a group Gi with order q. In-
formally, D D H IS the problem to decide whether c = ab when 
aP, bP and cP are gwen，where a^b^c G Z*. For every poly-
nomial Q and every probabilistic polynormal-time algorithm 
A^ for all sufficiently large k, 
AdvDD% = \PT[A{P, aP, bP, cP) = 1:— 
Pr[A(P, aP, bP, abP) = 1 : 0 < a, 6, c < g - 1] | (2.22) 
Definition 2.5.3 (Gap Diffie-Hellman(GDH)). A group 
G of order q is said to be GDH if there exists a polynomial 
time algorithm to solve D D H problem m G and no polynomial 
time algorithm m q to solve CDH problem with non-negligible 
probability of success. 
2.5.2 Co-GDH 
1. Gi and G2 are two cyclic multiplicative groups of prime 
order p 
2. gi is a generator of Gi and 仍 is a generator of G2. 
3. is a computable isomorphism from G2 to Gi,with V K仍）二 
9i 
4. e is computable bilinear map e : Gi x G2 一 Gt 
Definition 2.5.4 (Co-CDH). Let g2 he a point in a group 
G2 and h G Gi. For every polynomial Q and every PPT A, 
for all sufficiently large k, the advantage 
AdvCo—CDH4 二 PrlA(g2, g^, h) = h"" : 0 < a < p - 1] (2.23) 
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Definition 2.5.5 (Co-DDH). Let g] be a point m a group 
G2 and /i G Gi- For every polynomial Q and every PPT A, 
for all sufficiently large k, the advantage, Adv^o—DDH义 is 
(2.24) 
Definition 2.5.6 (Co-GDH Group).(仍，仍〜/i’/!�) is a 
CO-Diffie-HeJ,lm,o,n tuple. co-GDH gap group is defined to he 
group pairs Gi and G2 on which if there exists a polynomial 
time algorithm to solve co-DDH problem and no polynomial 
time algorithm to solve co-CDH problem with non-negligible 
probability of success. 
For general case, Gi = G2, it is possible to set Gi 二 G] such 
that 冲 is an identity map. In [12], it is essential to show that 
ijj should be proved its existence for security. 
With the reference of above operations, e and 妙 stated above. 
Here are the properties of three groups: Gi, G2 and Gt, 
where |Gi| = IG2I = \GT\ = p, p IS prime order. 
1. Bilinear: for all u e G^v e G2 and a,b e = 
2. Non-degenerate: e{gi,g2) + 1 
3. for any G G G2,e{uiu2,v) = e{ui,v)e{u2,v) 
4. for any ui,u2 G G2, 1^ 2) 二 e(?/^ (^ X2)，i^ i) 
2.6 Random Oracle Model 
Random oracle model (ROM) is a paradigm to act as a bridge 
between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice. 
The idea of R O M firstly appeared in the paper written by 
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Fiat and Shamir [32] and was formulated by Bellare and Ro-
gaway [7]. Canetti et.al [15] presented the gap between the 
model and the real implementations. [7] raised an implicit 
philosophy behind the use of a random oracle to an explic-
itly articulated paradigm with which maintains the benefits 
to practice. 
In practice, it is no formal definition to the hash functions 
(pseudorandom function family) but we capture a number of 
nice properties which it seems to possess. In the R O M , we 
assume hash functions are random functions and are pub-
licly accessible by all parties. Random oracle, T~L, is an ob-
ject to instantiate all hash functions in the model and reply 
all queries from the parties. A polynomial time algorithm 
cannot distinguish the query replied from a real world or 
the random oracle simulated by a function. It has following 
properties: 
1. 7Y is assumed to be a random function such that given 
an input, any party cannot guess the output with non-
neglibible probability. 
2. is a one-way function. Given an output, it is difficult 
to figure out the preimage of it. 
3. n ： {0,1}* — {0,1}⑴ 
4. H is collision resistant so that given x, y, where x ^ y, 
H{x) = H{y) with negligible probability. 
5. Given same inputs x and y, where x 二 y, H{x) = H{y). 
6. All parties in the model must query H for getting random 
values. They cannot distinguish the values generated by 
TL from the real hash function. 
Under the assumptions, it is obvious that there is no hash 
function which behaves a random function. R O M has an 
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assumption that the oracle is susceptible to attack but in 
reality, it may not be true. Therefore, a protocol which is 
said to be provably secure in the random oracle model may be 
insecure in practice. Despite of its impractical assumptions, 
the paradigm is useful to yield an efficient solution to prove 
the security of a protocol. It is better than no proof shown. 
In the coming subsections, four subparadigms in R O M : ran-
dom permutation, lunchtime attack, back patch and rewind 
simulations. 
2.6.1 Random Permutation 
A random permutation is a random oracle which its domain 
and range are in the same size. The mapping is bijective so 
that the output random number is collision resistant. For 
any inputs x and y for x ^ y, f{x) + f{y). This maintains 
data consistency. 
2.6.2 Lunchtime Attack 
Given a random oracle R : {0,1}* — {0,1}^, the probabil-
ity of a party that succeeds in finding a valid hashed value 
without the reply from the oracle is at most 1/q, which is 
negligible. All parties must ask the oracle for the hash value 
under the assumption of randomness of the oracle. 
2.6.3 Back Patch 
Under the lunchtime attack, any party cannot distinguish the 
source of the random numbers. A simulator can put a hard 
problem as one oracle reply. From the view of the party, it 
treats the number as a random value. 
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2.6.4 Rewind Simulation 
Rewind simulation is a common technique for DL-based sig-
nature and encryption. Back to PoK in sec. 2.1.6’ a signature 
can be created by replacing C by a hash value. For example, 
C = h{m, TZ). A signer can compute the response S by using 
its private key. 
Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm, T, can 
produce a message-signature pair with non-negligible prob-
ability. A simulator simulates the algorithm in R O M , it re-
places all queries (m^, TZj) by random value Ci. T can produce 
a valid signature by giving Si. 
At the Q-th query, the simulator changes the random tape of 
the random oracle and re-run J^ such that the query (mg, T^q) 
has a different reply CQ value. Say two transcripts at Q-th 
query after two runs, (TZ,C,S) and { V J T h e simula-
tor may extract a witness, say private key, from them in the 
polynomial time. 
Such technique can be found in forking lemma [58] and heavy 
row lemma [54 . 
2.7 Generic Group Model 
Generic group model of [53, 69, 66] is another model restrict-
ing all parties to a set of operations. They include random 
generation of integers and group elements, group computa-
tions, exponentiations, equality tests. There are only two 
data types: group elements and non-group data. 
It is assumed the the discrete logarithm problem is uncom-
putable in the GGM[53；. 
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Suppose there is a group, G. W e restrict ourselves to a poly-
nomial number of steps. Therefore, there are only a polyno-
mial number of unassociated group elements base g, public 
keys yi, commitments T^ i, . . .，卯’ randomly gener-
ated group elements Ui, • • •, Uq^. The computation transcript 
at each step r consists of 
= (2.25) 
i %' i" 
Each computation can only depend on parameters in exis-
tence before that step, resulting in zero exponent for param-
eters that come into existence after that step. 
Probabilities of hash collisions, discrete logarithm collisions, 
integer computation collisions are all assumed negligible. 
Chapter 3 
Digital and Threshold 
Signatures 
3.1 Introduction 
Digital signature is a cryptographic primitive that given any 
message, an entity can generate a digital signature by us-
ing its private key. Public can verify the signature by the 
corresponding public key. After the signature is generated, 
the message content cannot be altered. Repudiation is not 
allowed in digital signature schemes because only the signer 
possesses the private key which is used to generate the sig-
nature. A signature scheme is suitable for data integrity and 
authentication where modification to the signed message is 
not allowed. 
Definition 3.1.1. (Digital Signature) A digital signature scheme 
IS defined as three tuple {Q^ 5, V) s.t. 
• Q IS probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which on in-
put a security paramter , produces a key pair {PK, SK), 
where PK is public key and SK is the corresponding se-
cret key. 
26 
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• S is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which is 
given a security paramter secret key SK, and a mes-
sage m G {〇,1}^ and produces an output a, the signature 
on the message m. 
• V is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which is 
given {PK, a, m), returns accept if valid or otherwise, 
returns reject. 
The definition of the verification algorithm is relaxed to be a 
probabilistic algorithm which accepts a valid signature and 
rejects invalid signature with high probability, for all message 
and security parameters. The probability is taken over the 
coins of V and S. 
Diffie and Hellman [28] proposed that based on the trap-
door function model, a user can sign any message by ap-
pending a digital signature under a public key cryptosystem, 
e.g. R S A signature, El Gamal signature and D S A signature. 
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [63] constructed the first signa-
ture based on R S A in 1978. By using Fiat-Shamir Heuristics 
31], many identification schemes (or PoK) can be turned into 
signature schemes by using hash values to replace the random 
challenge. One of the formal definition of security for digital 
signatures was outlined by Goldwasser, Micali and Yao in 
'35]. Details in the security definitions can be studied from 
71, 7]. Among signature schemes, many rely on the ideal 
hash and the intractability of hard problems, such as D L P 
and Factoring Problem. Pointcheval and Stern [58] proved 
the security of El Gamal and Schnorr schemes in R O M . 
In the forthcoming subsections, we will go through the secu-
rity and two types of digital signature schemes. 
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3.2 Notion of Attacks and Security in Sig-
nature 
W e divide the attacks into three major kinds and order them 
in ascending severity. 
• Key-Only Attack: Only the public key is available to the 
adversary, and therefore it has the capability of checking 
the validity of the signature. 
• Known Signature Attack: In addition to the public key, 
adversary is provided a number of message-signature pairs 
chosen by a legal signer. 
• Chosen Message Attack: Adversary is allowed to ask the 
legal signer to sign messages chosen by the adversary 
according to the previous message and signature pairs. 
Here, we differentiate several levels of success for an adver-
sary. 
• Existential Forgery: The adversary can forge the signa-
ture of any message, not necessarily of his choice. 
• Selective Forgery: The adversary can succeed in produc-
ing a signature of some of the messages of his choice. 
• Universal Forgery: Without knowing the secret key of 
the signer, the forger still can produce a signature for 
any message. 
• Total Break: The adversary can compute the secret key 
of the signer. 
Level of security requirement is different according to various 
applications. The security in the literature is aimed at that 
with high probability a polynomial time adversary would not 
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be able to even existentially forge in the presence of a chosen 
message attack. A digital signature is said to be secure if a 
forger T, who can ask a signer for polynomial times, forges a 
message-signature pair which is not obtained from the signer. 
W e can divide the attack of T into two phases: learning 
and forgery phases. In the prior phase, it is given access to 
the signing oracle, SO, where [PK, SK) is generated by Q 
before the learning phase. It can query up to qs times for any 
messages unless these messages associated to the key. After 
this, T enters forgery phase in which it outputs a message-
signature pair. It is said to be success if V W (爪’ J) 二 accept, 
where m has not been queried. 
3.2.1 Types of Signatures 
In our thesis, we consider two types of signatures Hash-then-
One- WQ,y and Three-Move. For finer divisions and descrip-
tions, see chapter 10 in [7] and [3 . 
Full-domain R S A is a typical example of Hash-then-One-
Way. Let fpK be the trapdoor one-way function using public 
key PK and /益 be the corresponding inverse function given 
the secret key SK. Full-domain hash function, H : {0,1}* 
A maps message m and arbitrary information aux to domain 
A which is assumed to be an abelian group. The verification 
VpK is done by comparing trapdoor one-way outputfpK{s) 
and hash value aux). See fig. 3.1. 
Schnorr signature is a well-known instance of three-move 
type. It is similar to three-move PoK in sec. 2.1.6 in which 
the challenge is replaced by hash value. Three rounds are 
denoted as (7^,C,<S) in fig. 3.2. There are three functions: 
A, Z and H used in three stages of signature generation. 
A is a function to produce 7Z by inputting random value, 
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Signing Algorithm Verification 
S s K { m , 1^) = VpK{m, cr, 1 ^ ) -
(J — aux) 
L = h (m, aux) 
^ — r-ifr\ C = E{m, aux) 
^ = JSK\^) R /cA 
•D ‘ /c 、 e = /P 说） 
Heturn a = i<b,aux). ^ … ^ , 
Return accept if C = e. Otherwise reject. 
Figure 3.1: Hash-then-One-way Type Signature 
ran. Based on Fiat-Shamir Heuristics, C is generated by 
hash function, H : {0’ 1}* —> A as inputs m and TZ. Lastly, 
given SK,C,ran and Z, outputs S. Verification V intakes 
PK,C and 5. Function V transforms {SK,C,S). Then H 
hashes l/'s output and m, and compares it with C. 
Signing Algorithm Verification 
n ^ A{ran) a— (C , c S ) 
C = H(m,尺) z = y(C, S, PK) 
S = Z{SK, ran, C) e = H{m, 71) 
Return a = (C, S). Return accept ii C = e. Otherwise reject. 
Figure 3.2: Three-move Type Signature 
Definition 3.2.1 (Collision Property). There exists a 
polynomial time algorithm that computes private key SK (or 
witness) from (C, S) and {C, S'), which are two valid signa-
tures that correspond to the same commitment and message 
given to hash function H. 
Collision property is commonly found in security proofs in 
DL-based signature, e.g. Schnorr and modified El Gamal 
signatures using rewind simulation. 
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3.3 Threshold Signature 
Threshold signature is created by a number of entities who 
divide a secret among themselves. It is one of the threshold 
cryptosystems which was proposed by Desmedt [26]. Any 
t out of n entities can reconstruct the secret value. Given 
a message m，t signers provide partial signatures and then 
combine them into a full signature. Verifier is able to check 
the validity of the signature by a unique public key. Usually, 
t-out-of-n or (t, n) are used to represent a threshold system. 
Most communication, protocols and algorithms are designed 
for a number of users instead of two parties, threshold is a 
pivotal concept on changing classical cryptography to suit 
practical uses. 
Secret sharing, a commonly used technique in threshold cryp-
tosystem, was first discussed in How to share a secret written 
by Shamir [68] in 1979. A single secret can be distributed 
among n entities and t of them can reconstruct the secret 
by using polynomial interpolation. Other signature schemes 
•27, 64, 38] come after this. 
3.4 Properties in Threshold Signatures 
Unforgeabililty is a fundamental property derived from 
traditional digital signatures. In threshold signature, we 
may consider confidentiality and availability. Confidential-
ity means that no information can be recovered if less than 
t sharing are given. Availability means that not less than t 
entities can recover the secret. 
Robustness/Reliability is a study of number of wrong par-
tial shares the system can withstand. Verifier can recompute 
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desirable construction if at least t e partial results are is-
sued, where e is the number of errors. Some examples are 
found in [47，24'. 
No Trusted Dealer Many secret sharing requires an au-
thority, say group manager, to generate a public key and 
then distribute the partial secret keys to n users. 
The first deployment of no trusted dealer in the context was 
written by Pedersen [56, 34]. [22],which appeared in 2001, 
was one of examples in constructing a R S A threshold scheme 
without a trusted party. 
Proactive security is a study of threshold systems when 
one or more shares are stolen. In [25], Desmedt brought this 
problem up and proposed a solution to get new guaranteed 
correct shares without relying on a trusted dealer and to keep 
the old public key as long as reasonably possible. The con-
cept of proactiveness in threshold cryptography sappeared in 
many literature [39 . 
Insider's Anonymity Both outsiders and insiders are un-
able to figure out the acutal signers in the signing process. 





Blind Signature is one of the two building blocks in our pro-
posed schemes. It is a special type of digital signature that 
any signer does not know the content of the message. It is 
an interactive protocol between two parties, the signer and 
the user, whose signature is generated for a message chosen 
by the user. The signer is unable to give the order of the two 
given message-signature pairs which are signed by it. It also 
cannot determine when or for w h o m it is signed. 
The concept was introduced by D. Chaum [17] to enable 
spender anonymity in e-cash system. A client can obtain an 
electronic coin issued by any bank in the withdrawal process. 
Blind signature can offer privacy protection to the client by 
unlinkability between the coin and the client during or after 
the process. 
Juels et.al. [42] formalized a security notion for the sig-
natures, and generalized a technique for constructing se-
cure blind signature from any one-way trapdoor permuta-
tion. Pointcheval and Stern [57, 60] presented a way to show 
33 
CHAPTER 6. BLIND SAG SIGNATURE 34 
the security of Okamoto-Schnorr [72] and Okamoto-Guillou-
Qiiisquater [72] in R O M . One-more unforgery was introduced 
in it. A n attack on Schnorr [67] and Okamoto-Schnorr [72 
blind signatures was shown in [66]. Under an additional as-
sumption, R O S problem in R O M and generic model, two 
schemes were proven to be secure. D. Wagner [73] suggested 
a subexponential-time algorithm to solve R O S problem if 
there is no large prime factor in the group order. Bellare et.al 
5, 6] delivered chosen-target assumptions to prove the secu-
rity of a R S A [17] scheme against adaptive chosen message 
one-more unforgeability in R O M . [59] proved that the secu-
rity of Fiat-Shamir [31] and Guillou-Quisquater [45] blind 
signatures are equivalent to the R S A factoring problem in 
R O M . 
In this chapter, we discuss blind signature and its basic secu-
rity requirements. In subsequent sections, a review on several 
constructions based on various cryptosystems and their re-
lationships with Transferred Proof of Knowledge . These in-
clude Chaum's [18] R S A Blind Signature, Blind Schnorr Sig-
nature, Okamoto-Schnorr Blind Signature [55], and Boldyreva's 
Co-GDH Blind Signature. [55, 16] are some other examples. 
Definition 4.1.1 (A Blind Signature). It is a four-tuple 
(0，Z, Z/Z, V), comprising a pair of interactive tuning machines 
X and U, and two algorithms Q and V. 
• Q is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation al-
gorithm which takes an input security parameter and 
outputs a pair of public and secret key (^PK, SK). 
• X andlA are a pair of probabilistic polynomial-Ume Inter-
active Turing Machines, where both machines are given 
(separate) tapes: Let {PK, SK) be a key pair generated 
by Q which takes security parameter . They are both 
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given (on their input tapes) as a common input P K . I 
is given on her input tape a secret key SK . U is given 
on her input tape a message m G {0,1}*. The length of 
inputs are polynomially in security parameter k. X and 
lA engage in the interactive protocol of some polynomial 
in security parameter number of rounds. At the end of 
the protocol, X outputs completed or not-completed and 
lA outputs either failed or (a, m)，where a is the signature 
on m. 
• V is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes 
[PK) a, m) and outputs either accept or reject. 
4.1.1 Security Requirements 
There are two main types of proofs available for blind sig-
natures: complexity-based and random oracle model based. 
Former security proof approach is by reducing a problem 
to a well-defined hardness assumption (some are listed in 
sec. 2.3). Intuitively, an adversary can break a protocol in 
polynomial time, there exists a mean to solve the hard prob-
lem in polynomial time. The second approach is based on the 
R O M [7] for some which have difficulties in the prior proof. 
This is less preferable to the previous method since there is 
an assumption discussed in sec. 2.6. 
Unforgeability and blindness are key requirements for a se-
cure blind signature scheme. 
1. Unforgeability is for any adversarial user to produce 
blind signature by itself. Most schemes are proven to be 
secure against passive attack, the existential unforgery 
against chosen message attack. The strongest attack is 
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parallel one-more forgery against adaptive chosen mes-
sage attack first appeared in [57 . 
2. Blindness is that the adversarial signer is unable to find 
out when and for w h o m the two signatures are signed. 
Some additional features were added to the blind signature 
in the development to suit various applications. Abe et. al 
'1, 2] provided a notion of partial blind signature in which 
portion of information is pre-shared by the parties, e.g. date. 
4.2 Transferred Proof of Knowledge 
Transferred Proof of Knowledge, a variant of Proof of Knowl-
edge, is a 5^x-move protocol involving three parties: Trans-
fer Prover (TV), Warden (W) and Verifier (V). A P o K in 
sec. 2.1.6 is modified to add an intermediary party, W . TV 
tries to show W its knowledge on a witness in a PoK pro-
tocol. O n the other hand, W transfers this knowledge from 
TV to V. After completion of the protocol, either W or V 
cannot extract any witness. 
The six moves are summarized as : 
1. VJ is the commitment of TV. 
2. IZ is the commitment of W by adding/multiplying a 
blind factor to VJ suitably. 
3. C is the challenge given by V to W . 
4. C is the challenge by W by modifing C suitably based 
on the blind factor on VJ. 
5. S' is the response of TV by using its knowledge of secret. 
6. S is the response of W based on S' without knowing any 
secret. 
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Figure 4.1: Transferred Proof of Knowledge (TPoK) 
By Fiat-Shamir Heuristics, T P o K can be changed to blind 
signature by replacing the challenge C with a hash value. In 
some paper, T P o K is also named as dwerUble protocol 
4.3 R S A Based Schemes 
In this section, we go through two RSA-based blind signa-
tures. The prior scheme, the first realization in the literature, 
was presented in [17]. Then we present one construction de-
rived from Abe et. al. [3 . 
4.3.1 Chaum's RSA Scheme 
Let n 二 pq where p and q are two large primes and e be the 
public exponent s.t. 三 1 mod Lp{n). (n, e) and d are the 
public and private key pair of the signer. Let H : {0,1}* 一 
Z* be the secure full-domain hash function, m, m G {0,1}* 
f i 
is the message of the user. 
The signature on the message, m is S. 
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n' = n = I 
t Gr Z: 
C = Cte mod n C = H(爪) 
= C'd mod n — 
I 
S = S'/t mod n 
= H { m Y mod n 
Figure 4.2: Chaum's RSA Blind Signature 
For any given message, there is one unique blind factor t 
for H{m) to map C to C. Therefore, it is unconditional 
blindness. Bellare et.al. analyzed unforgeability in paper [5 
by introducing an assumption. 
4.3.2 Abe's RSA Scheme 
Let n = pq where p, q are two large primes and e be the public 
exponent s.t. ed 三 1 mod (p{n). (n, e) and d are the public 
and private key pair of the signer. Let H : {0,1}* — ILn 
be the secure full-domain hash function, m G {0，1}* is the 
message of the user. In [4], signatures made by claw-free 
permutation can use the similar technique to achieve blind 
signature schemes. Chan et.al. [16] used R S A as concrete 
example as shown below. 
The signature on the message, m is (C, S) in fig. 4.3. 
For any given message, there exists a unique blind factor t 
for IZ — C to map to C. 
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n' = 1 
n^RZN 
t GR z: 
C = H { m , IZ mod n) 
C, C' = {n- mod n 
S' 二 mod n 
= S'/t mod n 
s.t C = + C mod n) 
Figure 4.3: Another RSA Blind Signature 
4.4 Discrete Logarithm Based Schemes 
In this section, we review the most typical blind signature 
scheme built by Schnorr identification [65] and Fiat-Shamir 
Heuristics [31]. The first one is Schnorr blind signature and 
the second one is Okamoto-Schnorr blind signature. 
4.4.1 Schnorr Blind Signature 
Let G 二< 〉be the group generated by g modulus p with 
order q, where p is a prime, y and x are the public-private 
key pair s.t. y 二 g^ mod p. H : {0，1}* 一 Zq is a hash 
function. m’m Er {0,1}* denotes the message. 
The signature on m is (C, S) in fig. 4.4. Blindness is information-
theoretically achievable since there are q possibilities of (a, /?) 
pairs to get the same result for any message-signature pair. 
Unforgeability has been extensively discussed in [66, 73 . 
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T en ZQ a, P ZQ 
n' = gt mod p n' 11 = 
“C = Him, g-ay-f^R'、 
C = C + (3 mod p 
C 
<5' = t — C'x mod p 
_ 
S = S' — a mod p 
s . t . C = H[m,gCyS) 
Figure 4.4: Schnorr Blind Signature 
4.4.2 Okamoto-Schnorr Blind Signature 
Let G be the group generated by g modulus p with order 
q, where p is a prime. There is another generator h in the 
group with the same order, y and {xi,x2)) is the public-
priavte key pair s.t. y = g^^h^^ m o d p. H : {0，1}* 一 is 
a hash function, m, m Gr {0,1}* denotes the message. The 
signing algorithm is shown in the fig. 4.5. 
The signature on m is (C,<S). Okamoto-Schnorr's has similar 
properties as in Schnorr blind signature. The result is a 
representation of a given group element based on multiple 
generators. Unforgeability has been discussed in [57, 60, 66， 
73；. 
4.5 Bilinear Mapping Based Schemes 
W e will go through two bilinear mapping scheme, one is orig-
inated in a paper [8] written by Boldyreva. 
Let G =< g > he the G D H group with prime order q and y 
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ti,h GR Zg —R Zg 
n' = gt他2 m o d p n' R = g-ah-f^yl 
C == C + 7 mod p 
C 
= ti — c'xi mod p 
52 = t2- C'X2 mod p 
S — 4 ) = s'l - a mod p 
^ 52 = S2 — P mod p 
S = (51,52) 
s.t. C = 
Figure 4.5: Okamoto-Schnorr Blind Signature 
and X are the public-private key pair where y 二 m, m G 
{0,1}* denotes the message and H : {0，1}* — G is a hash 
function. 
X S_ 
7^二 7^, = 1 
t <-R Zg 
C = Him) 
I C = Cgt 
S' = C'工 
s' _ 
s = S'y-' 
s.t.C = S^ mod n 
Figure 4.6: Boldyreva's Bilinear Blind Signature 
The signature on m is S. Unconditional blindness is obtained 





Spontaneous Anonymous Group (SAG) signature is a paradigm 
of creating a signature on behalf of a group without sharing 
a common secret. There is no setup or no trusted third 
party or group manager is involved in preprocessing stage. 
A n entity can conscript n — 1 diversion members arbitrar-
ily and complete a signature without any participation of 
the members. Verifier knows those possible signers in order 
to make the signature trustworthy. Most existing schemes 
maintain unconditional signer-ambiguity and irrevocability. 
Signer-ambiguity is that verifiers can figure out the signer no 
better than wild guess even all private keys and information 
is given to the the distinguisher. 
The concept of S A G and a realization based on polynomial 
interpolation appeared in [21]. The notion of ring signature 
brought about by Rivest et.al. [62], also named as RST, 
was one of the ring-structured S A G signature. Its security 
relied on the existence of one-way trapdoor function and 
42 
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the ideal cipher model,which contains a stronger assump-
tion than R O M . Bresson et.al [13] suggested a polynomial 
threshold S A G signature requiring the existence of one-way 
trapdoor function but no ideal cipher model. Abe et.al [3 
proposed a ring-structured S A G signature to support sep-
arability. If a scheme supports separability, entities have 
no restrictions on choosing parameters for their key pairs. 
In Asiacrypt'02, Zhang and Kim [75] used bilinear maps to 
build ID-based ring signature. Wong et.al. [74] proposed a 
threshold ring signature scheme using an alternate boolean 
construction method. Liu et.al. [43] and Abe et.al. [4] used 
CDS-type [21] to construct threshold separable S A G signa-
tures. Boneh et.al. [11] constructed another S A G signature 
by bilinear maps. A n undesired property (some may argue 
this as advantage) is that new comers can join the existing 
S A G signature. 
Definition 5.1.1 (SAG Signature). A threshold SAG Sig-
nature IS a triple Vt,n) where 
• Q IS a prohabilistic-tvme key generation algorithm which 
takes security parameter and outputs a pair {PK^ SK) 
public and private key 
• Xt^n 仏 a prohaMUstic algorithm. Let L — {PKi^ • . . , PKn} 
be a public key set and J C {1, • • • , n}, where \ J\ - t. 
工which takes security parameter , {SKi : i G J} 
and message m G {0,1}*, outputs a. 
• Vt,n is an algorithm which inputs (L, m, a), outputs ac-
cept or reject. 
The security of S A G signature considers two aspects: signer-
ambiguity and unforgeability. 
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1. Signer-ambiguity is that the adversary, for any mes-
sage, any signature and any public key set, has no ad-
vantage in finding out the actual signer better than wild 
guess. Most schemes achieve unconditional signer-ambiguity 
while some variants, e.g. linkable and culpable S A G 
siganture [44]’ may satisfy it computationally. 
2. Unforgeability means that any polynomial-time algo-
rithm, given access to a signing oracle on querying any 
message and any public-key set adaptively, can output a 
signature with negligible probability. It is secure against 
adaptive chosen message and public-key set existential 
forgery. 
5.2 Cramer-Damgard-Schoemaker (CDS) 
SAG Signature 
In [4] and [43], they treated CDS-type S A G as backbone to 
achieve threshold for both 3-move type and trapdoor one-way 
claw-free signatures. 
5,2.1 (l’n)-CDS type SAG Signature 
Given n public keys L = {PKi,... , PKn} and m G {0’ 1}*. 
Let SKT^ be private key of the actual signer indexed by 
TT, 1 < TT < n. m G { 0 , 1 } * is the message going to be signed 
and H is di hash function. 
Signing Algorithm 
By using PoK described in sec. 2.1.6 the signature is gener-
ated as follows: 
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1. For i = 1 to n and + tt, is generated by selecting 
random and S^. 
2. For TT, randomly picks 
3. Computes Co = Co = H{L, m，T^ i’... , TZ") • 
4. Find C^ ^ by satisfying the following equation 
71 
E c 「 o 
？：二 0 
5. Given Ct^  and IZ兀,computes the corresponding response 
S-j^  using its witness. 
The signature on m and L is (L, C。’ Ci，• •. , C"，c?i, • • • , cS"). 
Verification Algorithm 
O n receiving (L, Co, Ci, • • • ’ C",’5i’. •. , S^) and message m’ 
the verifier runs the following algorithm: 
1. For each ^  = {1, • • • , n}, computes IZ^  from challenge C,, 
and response Si. 
2. Calculates Co = H{L, m, T^i,. . • , IZ.n) 
3. If Yy:=o 二 0 then accept, otherwise reject. 
5.2.2 (t rO-CDS type SAG Signature 
Given n public keys L 二 {pki, • • • ,pka} and message rn G 
{0,1}* . Let / C {!.••• ,7i}, |/| = t. Given 5 二 {SK^ : 
TT G /}. m G {0. 1}* is the message going to be signed and 
H : {0.1}* 一 A is a hash to domain. A. 
Signing Algorithm 
By using PoK described in sec. 2.1.6 the signature is gener-
ated as follows: 
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1. For i ^  I^TZ^ is generated by random selected Ci and Si. 
2. For TT G /, randomly picks IZ^ . 
3. Computes Co 二丑(L, m, 7^4,... ,lZn). 
4. Using Co and {Ci \ i ^  /} values to generate a polynomial 
f of degree no more than n — t s.t. 
Co = /(O) and C, = /⑷ 
,Vz, 1 < 2 < n. 
5. For TT G /, signer tt computes the response Sj^  by using 
its S K ^ given C^ ^ = /(tt). 
The signature on m and L is (L, /, • • • , Sn). 
Verification Algorithm 
O n receiving (L, /, Si, • ‘ ‘ , Sn) and message m, the verifier 
runs the following: 
1. For each i = {1,... , nj, computes Ci 二 f{i) and recon-
structs IZi from Ci and S^. 
2. If Co = /(L’m’7^ i’... ,IZn) then accept, otherwise re-
ject. 
5.3 Ring-type SAG Signature Schemes 
5.3.1 Ri vest- S hamir=Tauman 
Rivest et.al. [62] proposed the first ring signature based on 
R S A cryptosystem in the literature. Their scheme assumed 
the existence of one-way trapdoor permutation in ideal ci-
phertext model. 
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For each member, it generates public-private key pair as 
{PKI, SKI) = ((n^ , EI),di) s.t. ed 三 1 m o d Let L = 
{PKi, • • • , PKn] be a set of n public keys. W e denote 
SKj^ be the private key of the actual signer, who is in-
dexed by TT, 1 < TT < n. A symmetric encryption, E^ ： 
{0 ,1 }^ X {0’ 一 {0 ,1 }^ is a permutation over { 0 , 1 } �w h e r e 
I is the security parameter. Let H : {0,1}* — {0,1}^ be any 
secure hash function, m G {0,1}^ is the message going to be 
signed. 
W e show one construction in [62] by using RSA-key pairs. 
Let public key be P K i = (rii, e^ ) and private key be SKi = dk 
s.t. e,i4i — 1 m o d (p{ni)‘ A one-way permutation of Z^^: 
fi{x) = x^' mod n^ (5.1) 
Assume each member holding trapdoor information, inverse 
permutation /「丄 can be computed efficiently. In order to 
make all members working in the same domain an extended 
trap-door permutation 访 is defined to make all fi to a com-
mon domain. 
Definition 5.3.1 (Extending trap-door permutations 
to a common domain). For any b-hit message m, m — 
qiU^ + Ti, where r^ > 0； then 
gi{m) = < (5.2) 
m : else 
V 
The function g^  is still a permutation over {0,1}^, and it is a 
one-way trapdoor permutation since only one who knows how 
to invert can invert g^  efficiently on more non-negligible 
fraction of possible inputs. 
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Signing Algorithm 
The signing algorithm is described as follows: 
1. Signer computes a symmetric key t, 
t 二 H{m,L) 
2. Pick a random number v G {0，1}^ 
3. For z TT, the signer picks x,-^  E {0,1}^ and computes 
y'L 二 
4. The signer finds “兀 by 
yi ④ y2..•① yn 二 y 
5. Signer computes Xj^  by 
Xn 二 g'^iVTr) 
The signature on m and L is (i;, Xi, • • • , Xn). See fig. 5.1 for 
more details. 
Verification Algorithm 
A verifier, on receiving m and (L, v, Xi, •.. , x^), follows the 
verification algorithm: 
1. For i 二 1, • •. , n, the verifier computes 
y,L 二 g'iXoc'L) 
2. The verifier computes t as 
t = H{L,m) 
3. If 1/1 ① 1/2...① Vn 二 accept; otherwise, reject. 
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Figure 5.1: RST SAG Signature 
5.3.2 Abe's 1-out-of-n Ring Signature 
Abe et.al. [3] and Liu et.ai [43] proposed another ring struc-
tured S A G signature in a more generic way. Their construc-
tions do not have restrictions on choosing public key parame-
ter. The below shows a concrete example of Abe's 1-out-of-n 
S A G signature based on D L and RSA. Both can be changed 
to any type of one way function and one-way trapdoor func-
tion, respectively. 
For i 二 1，... , n, if user i has a DL-based key pair, his pub-
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lie key is q”yi) and private key is oc” where Xi G Zq^ ^ 
where pi and Qi are primes and Qi \pi — 1,仿 is the generator 
of order q^ . Hi : {0,1}* —> is a secure hash. If the user i 
has a RSA-based key pair, then his public key is (e^ , Nj) and 
private key is d“ where Ni is a product of two large equal 
length primes and e此三 1 mod (p{n). H.^ : {0,1}* —> Zyv,- A 
signer wants to sign the message m G {0,1}*. 
Signing Algorithm 
The signing algorithm is described as follows: 
1. Signer picks 
{g^ mod p-j^, a G Zq^ : if user tt using DL - b a s e d 
T  
a G : if user n using RSA-based 
and computes 
Cvr+i 二 
2. For i 二 TT + 1, • •. ’ 72’ 1，... , TT — 1, signer picks Si 
( 
P e Zq. : if user i using DL-based = < ‘ 
I /3 G ZN^ : if user i using RSA-based 
and computes 
1 m, gf'y^" mod pi) : if user i using DL-based 
Ci+l 二 S 
m, Ci + S? mod Ni) : if user i using RSA-based 
3. Then signer computes ST^ by 
( 
a — CjrX^  mod q^  : if user i using DL-based 
(JZ^ — C兀)冗 mod N沉: if user i using RSA-based v. 
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The signature on the message,m is (L,Ci,5i’ • •. ,Sn). See 
fig. 5.2 for more details. 
Verification Algorithm 
A verifier, on receiving m and (L,Ci’5i’... , Sn), it follows 
the verification algorithm as below: 
1. For i = 1,...，n) the verifier computes 
[ m, gf'yf" mod pi) : if user i using DL-based 
Ci+i 二 \ 
I m, C, + cSf mod Ni) : if user i using RSA-based 
2. Signer computes 
f Qn '^yi '^  mod pn ： if user n using DL-based 
7Zn — \ 
1 Cn + cSf mod Nn ： if user n using RSA-based 
3. If Ci = Hi{L,m,TZn), accept; otherwise, reject. 
5.4 Discussions 
S A G signature is suitable for many applications requiring pri-
vacy protection, e.g. e-voting system and whistle-blowing. 
Its variant, linkable and culpable S A G signature [44], in-
cludes a tag for showing the same signature is generated by 
the same person. The idea is useful as any user cannot gen-
erate same vote for one event. Besides, this idea is good for 
other applications, such as e-cash. 
However,most S A G signature schemes are in 0(n) which 
means that the size of the signature grows with number of 
members. W h e n the size of the signature is independent of 




I + 风4 m， 
姆 ， m ， D J 
乂 人， 
\ z 式 
mmmrnm ^^ 
Figure 5.2: Abe's 1-out-of-n SAG Signature 
the number of possible signer, S A G signature is more prac-
tical. In latest literature [29], they proposed accumulators 
to make the size constant but its computation complexity 
remains high. 
Chapter 6 
Blind SAG Signature 
6.1 Introduction 
Blind spontaneous anonymous group (SAG) signature is a 
protocol between a user and t individuals among n signers. 
It is motivated by the desire of allowing a user to obtain a 
blind signature on a group of people while all signers receives 
no knowledge on the message and other members. The user 
can interact with t signers using blind signature protocol and 
select n — t diversion members arbitraily. Thus, spontaneity 
is retained. All parties, except the user, are unable to fig-
ure out who signed the S A G signature, and signer-ambiguity 
is maintained as well. Since any participant is unware of 
the public key set and the message, it is unable to link up 
message-signature pair or signature-signer relationships dur-
ing and after the protocol. 
Unlinkability of signature and signer is an interesting prop-
erty inherited from two paradigms. In most blind signature 
schemes, public can authenticate who signed for a message 
though the signer is unaware of its content. In group blind 
signature [46], although outsiders are failed to find out the 
signer, group manager has power to do so. In our proposed 
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scheme, even the actual signer is impossible to point out 
whether a given signature, which the public key set includes 
itself, is signed by it or not. The property is resulted from 
the message-blindness from classical blind signature and the 
signer-ambiguity originated in S A G signature scheme. 
It is useful for the applications acquiring privacy protection 
of signers and user. Credential systems,e.g.e-cash and e-vote, 
can be built by our scheme. A credential system is a system 
where users can obtain credentials from organizations and 
demonstrate its possession of these credential while prevent-
ing cooperation among organizations from monitoring their 
activities. In Chen [20], she built a pseudonym credential 
with traditional blind signature. Our threshold blind S A G 
signature is suitable to replace it for better protection to a 
set of the signers. 
Our contribution proposes a framework to blind S A G sig-
nature, its security model and proofs. W e also suggest a 
threshold version in the framework. In this chapter, we will 
go through security requirements, model, modular construc-
tions and proofs in subsequent sections. Lastly, a short de-
scription of application will be given. 
6.2 Security Definitions 
Definition 6.2.1 (A Blind SAG Signature). A blind 
SAG signature is a (n + 3)-tuple ‘ • • V)； com-
prising (n + 1) interactive turing machines Xi, • • • ,Xn cmd 
U, and two algorithms Q and V. 
• Q is a probabilistic polynomial-Ume key-generation algo-
rithm which takes an input security parameter and 
outputs a pair (^PK, SK) of public and secret key. 
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•工I, for i = {!,••• n} and U are polynomially-bounded 
probabilistic Interactive Turing Machines, where all ma-
chines are given the (separate) tapes. Let (PX^, SKi) 
be a key pair of Ti generated by inputting to Q• Let 
L = {PKi,... , PKn} denote a list of public keys and 
J c {!,••• ’ n}，where \ J\ = t. For each is given on 
its input tape a secret key SKi and corresponding public 
key,PKi. U is given on its input tape a message m G 
{0 ’ 1}* and L. The length of inputs are polynomial in 
security parameter, k where k =rnin {ki : z = 1, • • • , n}. 
For i e J, Ti and U engage in the interactive proto-
cols of some polynomial in security parameter number of 
rounds. At the end of the protocols, Xi outputs completed 
or not-completed and U outputs either (L, a, m) or fail. 
• V IS a probabilistic polynormal-Urne algorithm that takes 
(L, (J, m) and outputs either accept or reject. 
The security of this signature scheme consists of two require-
ments: blindness and one-more forgeability. In addition, it 
requires signer-ambiguity . A blind S A G signature is secure 
if they are satisfied. 
6.2.1 Security Model 
In our model, we define some oracles in our simulation. 
1. SO (Signing Oracle): Upon input a public key PK' and 
any message m,，it outputs a valid signature a'. 
2. SAGSign (SAG Signing Oracle): Upon input public key 
list L,’ length n,’ threshold t,，message m,’ it outputs a 
valid S A G signature (!/, n', t', m, a'). 
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3. BlindSign (Blind Signing Oracle): Upon query, it con-
ducts a 4-move interactive protocol with the querier Q 
as follows: 
(a) Move-0: Q sends PK'. 
(b) Move-1: BlindSign sends a 尺 to Q. 
(c) Move-2: Q sends C to BlindSign. 
(d) Move-3: BlindSign returns S such that {TZ, S) forms 
a valid PoK w.r.t. PK'. 
4. Random Oracle: Upon receiving a query, it outputs a 
random number. All query-reply pairs are kept in record 
and no same reply for different queries. 
Definition 6.2.2 (Completeness). If all parties are honest 
m following the protocols, then the output of the interactions 
with various oracles will produce valid signatures. 
Definition 6.2.3 (Game UF). 1. (Setup) Upon input a 
security parameter generate parameters n, t, and in-
vokes Q for n times to generate key pairs (^PKi, SKj)’ 
1 < i < n. The above, except the secret keys, are pub-
lished. 
2. A forger, T makes qb (resp. qs, Qh, Qa) queries to the 
BlindSign (resp. SO, random oracle, SAGSign). 
3. T delivers > qs/t valid SAG signatures (L,, n“ U, rui, (Ji), 
1 < i < <75+1，none of which coincides with any SAGSign 
query output. 
Remark: For simplicity, we require T to deliver S A G signa-
tures with the same threshold t, and each public key used 
in S A G signatures delivered by T must have been generated 
in the Setup Phase of Game UF. In this paper, we restrict 
ourselves to at most a polynomially many queries in terms 
of the security parameter. 
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Definition 6.2.4. (Parallel One-more Unforgeability (plm-
uf)) A blind SAG signature scheme is parallel one-more un-
forgeable (against adaptive chosen-message, chosen-pubhc-
key active attackers) if no PPT adversary can successfully 
complete Game UF with non-negligible probability. 
Remark: Specializing to n 二力二 1, the above definition is 
defining plm-uf of classic blind signatures. 
Definition 6.2.5 (Blindness). A blind SAG signature scheme 
has blindness if the probabthty distribution of the signafmre 
produced by U is indistinguishable from the probability dis-
tribution of the signatures produced by U conditioned on the 
1 < z < n conversation that produced it. 
Roughly speaking, 
f S A G signature BlindSign Oracle 1 
Pr < > = 
by U conversation J 
f S A G signature 
Pr < > 
\ byZ^  J 
6.3 (l,n)-Ring Structured Blind SAG Sig-
nature 
{PK^, SKi) is the public-private key pair of signer, and 
L : {PKi,. •.，PKn} is the public key set of n signers. Let 
m G {0,1}* be a message and Hi be a hash function in a 
suitable range accordingly. W e denote the signer as Z兀 who 
interacts with the user, U. 
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6.3.1 Signing Protocol 
1. XTT sends a commitment 7?4 to U. 
2. U generates a blind factor to commit TZ^ :^ 
Ctt+i = H兀 
3. For f = {tt + 1’ … ’ n, 1’ … ’ tt — 1}, Z/Z 
(a) Computes C糾 二 m, TZi) 
(b) Generates PoK, /Q+i = (T^ +^i, by simulat-
ing without using secret. 
4. U: 
(a) Obtains C^ = H入L, m, T^ tt-i) 
(b) Sends C； to Z兀. 
(c) Get the reply S'^  from 工兀. 
(d) Reconstructs S^ .^ 
U outputs (Ci’<Si’... on m and L. A picturesque de-
scription is shown in fig. 6.1. 
6.3.2 Verification Algorithm 
Verifier, on receiving .. • ， o n m and L, does the 
following to verify 
1. For f 二 1 to n — 1, reconstructs by Ci and S” and 
computes 
Q+i 二 
2. Reconstructs 7^n by Cn,Sn. If Ci 二 i^(L,m,7^n)’ then 
accept, otherwise reject. 
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Figure 6.1： 1-out-of-n Blind SAG Signature (Abe [3]) 
6.4 CDS-type Bl ind SAG Signature 
6.4.1 (l,n)-CDS-type 
(PK,, SK^) is the public-private key pair of signer X, and 
L = {PKi,...，PKn} is the public key set of n signers. Let 
m G {0’ 1}* be a message and be a secure hash function 
in suitable domain accordingly. W e denote the signer as 
who interacts with the user, U. 
CHAPTER 6. BLIND SAG SIGNATURE 60 
Signing Protocol 
1. For each i + tt, generates (尺”。“^ ?^ ) by simulation. 
2. Xtt sends a commitment VJ^ to U. 
3. U generates KT, from VJ^ by a blind factor and computes 
Co = ,尺n) 
4. U : 
(a) Finds C沉 s.t XliLo ^^ 二 〇 
(b) Sends C； to 
(c) Obtains S^ ^ from 
(d) Reconstructs S^ by removing the blind factor. 
U outputs (Co, Ci’ …，Cn, 5i，... , Sn) on m and L. 
Verification Algorithm 
Verifier, on receiving (Co’Ci,... ,Cn,Si, ‘ ‘ ‘ , Sn) on m and 
L, does the followings to check its validity: 
L For i = 1 to n, reconstructs by Q and Si 
2. Computes Co 二 Hn(L,M, TZ!,... ,TZn) 
3. If 二oCi 二 0 then accept, otherwise reject. 
6.5 (t’n) - CDS-type 
{PK.,, SKI) is the public-private key pair of signer, X,. L = 
{PKi’ •..，PKn} is the public key set of n signers and J C 
《1’. .. , n}, where \ J\ 二 t. Let m G {0,1}* be a message and 
丑 is a hash function in a suitable range. W e denote all real 
signers as 工兀，where tt G J. 
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6.5.1 Signing Protocol 
The signature is generated by U as follows: 
1. For each i ^  J,U generates by PoK simula-
tion. 
2. For each n e J, U receives a commitment TZ^ , from 工兀 
and generates TZ兀. 
3. Constructs a polynomial of degree not more than n - t 
over a suitable range (e.g. Zq over the field Z* with order 
q) s.t. 
/(O) 二丑(i：，m’7^ l’…’7^ n) and /(z) = for z ^  J 
4. For each TT E J,U 
(a) Obtains C^^ 二 /(tt) 
(b) Sends C； to I^. 
(c) Gets S'K from 工兀. 
(d) Reconstructs S ^ 
User outputs signature cr = (/,5i,... ,Sn) on m and L. 
6.5.2 Verification Algorithm 
Verifier, on receiving (/,5i, • • • on m and L, does the 
followings to verify the signature: 
1. For i 二 1 to n, reconstructs by Ci and S^. 
2. If Co == • • • ,7^ n), then accept, otherwise 
reject. 
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6.6 Security Analysis 
W e prove the completeness, the blindness, and the parallel 
one-more unforgeability of our blind S A G signature schemes. 
In the process, we also prove an extension of Schnorr's [66 
R〇S result from single public key to multiple public keys. 
T h e o r e m 6.6 .1 . The parallel one-more unforgeability (plm-
uf) of Schnorr (resp. Okamoto-Schnorr) blind signature is 
equivalent to the ROS Problem in the random oracle model 
plus the generic group model. 
In Schnorr's security model [66], all queries to blindsign are 
w.r.t. a single public key P K . W e generalize it to multiple-
key parallel one-more unforgeability (mk-plm-uf) by allowing 
the forger T to query BlindSign with K different (PIQ , 
1 < 2 < n, a total of qb times in order to produce a total 
of + 1 signatures each of which is verifiable against some 
members of the set of public keys {PKi,... , PKk}- • 
T h e o r e m 6.6.2. The multiple-key parallel one-more unforge-
ability (mk-plm-uf) of Schnorr (resp. Okamoto-Schnorr) blind 
signature is equivalent to the ROS Problem in the random or-
acle model plus the generic group model 
Proof. The generic mk-plm attacker, T is as follows: 
1. Obtain commitments: 1Zk,i, l < k < K , l < i < qsy, 
where Y^k = Qb-
2. Compute and then send challenges Ck,” I < k < K, 
l < i < qB,k. 
3. Receive responses Output + 1 signatures 
A A A � A 
{iZij.Sij) on messages m^j where Uij 二 g ~y】，），(k,]= 
d^nd 1 < i < K, 1 < J < qsp = 
你 + 1 
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The oracle conversations can be arbitrarily interleaved. The 
A A 1 
hash query C^j 二 H{TZij,mij) must have been made. 
A 
Let fr{ij) = Cij, for some index mapping r. 
In Eq(2.25), we can treat u^ 二 y 卯 T h e u^'s can be used as 
public keys in querying the SO. If they are not used as such, 
then set 饥 卯 二 0. They cannot be used as public keys in 
the delivered signatures, if the conditions so require. There-
fore, we can omit the u,s w丄o.g. Expanding the subscript of 
the t's from one to two according to the current convention, 
we obtain 
f r m = g S ^ 
二 广隐-ijK视 
k' k i 
= ⑶ ， - 1 Yl Yl YISgS、iy，，’t)bT(⑶，k，‘t 
k' k I 
and 




= — k ' �+ a丁眺k' + X^C"，力t(g),/C'，” 
i 
where the Kronecker delta S(u, v) 二 1 when u 二 and equals 
0 otherwise. Note that the last two A-coefficients are com-
putable by the generic adversary, but not by the Simulator. 
Therefore rewinding will not enable the Simulator to extract 
any secret key. 
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Case (1): As^ij = 丄k'=〇 for all j, k'. Then the 
generic adversary has solved the R O S Problem: 
A V > 
C£,j 二 + / all ij. 
i 
八 
where Ci/s are + 1 hash outputs. 
Case (2): the opposite. Then the generic adversary has com-
puted a nontrivial linear dependence among discrete logrithms 
of Hk', i.e. the generic adversary has solved the one-more dis-
crete logarithm problem. 
Remark: In the generic group model (GGM), the above lin-
ear dependence is a form of discrete logarithm collision. It 
can be deducted in G G M that the probability of a P P T al-
gorithm being able to compute a discrete logarithm collision, 
including the kind above, is negligible. • 
Theorem 6.6.3 (Completeness). Our blind SAG signa-
ture has completeness. 
Proof: Trivial. 
Theorem 6.6.4 . [Blindness] Assume L, n, t are fixed. Our 
ring-type (resp. CDS-type) blind SAG signature has blind-
ness provided the underlying blind signature also has it. 
Proof Sketch. Denote the SAGBIindSign session communica-
tion transcripts by Pok, 二 (IZ工,S,), 1 < z < t, and the 
S A G signature in question by (L, n, t, m, a) where ..， 
Tlnfiw ..，Cn, • • • , By the Z K of the underlying blind 
signatures,(尺i’C"<Si) is statistical zero knowledge Further-
more, (non-blind) S A G signatures are statistical zero knowl-
edge about which secret key actually generated it. Therefore 
(J is ZK. • 
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Theorem 6.6.5. (Unforgeabilityy) Our ring-type (resp. (t,n)-
CDS-type with t = 1) SAG blind signature based on Schnorr 
or Okamoto-Schnorr blind signature is parallel one-more un-
forgeable (plm-uf) provided Schnorr’s ROS Problem is hard, 
m the generic group model (GGM) plus the random oracle 
model (ROM). 
Proof. W e prove for threshold CDS-type on condition t = 1. 
Let G =< g > and public key pair PKi, SK, for 工〜is (队，x,) 
s.t.队=g〜mod p, where p is prime. The generic attacker in 
G G M of plm-uf of blind Schnorr S A G signature is as follows: 
1. Input: a list of public keys L 二 { y i , . . . ,yn}-
2. Receive commitments 尺a；,” 1 < ^ < QB.k from L,. Note 
E/c =卯 . 
3. Send challenges Ck,” receives responses Sk,i. 
A A /N 
4. Output S A G signatures c r尸 . . . ,兄 j , n , ..•’ 
dp, 5?,1’ ... ’ Sj^ n) on message ifij, 1 < j < + 1-
A 八 A _ 
The queries C?.,。=丑(L, n,力’ r^” 尺)，i，...，7^ )，n), I < J < 
g^ + l, must have been made. Let the Lagrange interpolation 
be indicated 二 〇• By G G M , there exists an 
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index mapping r such that, for I < J < (jB-r I and 1 < £ < 
hji = g、i/i」' 
二 严 -
t 丨 k.t 
= / 稱 - l y r " 严 ' n ( • 斤 " ， 卜 … - - - ‘ 
1 = ；八、以;口where 
L丨 
^sjl 二 -^jJ. + «T(,yi).-l + X^S人、力丄"all J.(： 
k,i 
T h e iie^lio:il)ilitv of discrete logarit l i in collision leads to 
O O 、-j 
0 二 -CjA, + (:i丁u.nr + CkAij.nj。, all 丄 
U }、] 
n 
!</'<// L' k.t 
for 1 < y < (IB T 1. The generic adversarv has solved t he 
above R O S Problem, where d,。are qn 十 1 luish out puis. 
• 
Hi mark: The rediiction in Theorem Ci.G.l is actually to the 
R O S Problem or the Discrete Logaritliiu Problem (DLP). 
The recluctioii iii Theorem 6.G.2 (resp. Theorem G.G.5) is 
actualh- to t lie liOS Problem or the one-mo it dtscndt log 
(IniDL) i)roi)leiii. (The ImDL Pi.obleiii: (•oiiii)iitP all dis-
crete logaritliins log".仏 for 1 < ij < Qol — 1- given (j and ./力. 
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…，yqDL+i and a total of qdl queries to a Corruption Oracle, 
which returns the discrete logarithms of qualified query val-
ues.) In the G G M , it can be deducted that the probability 
of computing dicrete log collisions, which include D L P and 
ImDL, is negligible for P P T algorithms. 
6.7 Applications to Credential System 
A credential system is a system in which where users can 
demonstrate its possession of credentials issued by some orga-
nizations while preventing cooperation among organizations 
from monitoring their activities. In order to protect the pri-
vacy of an individual, a system may grant its access based 
on pseudonym only. A system should have unforgeability and 
unUnkahiUty. Unlinkability means that no pseudonym can be 
linked to the identity of the individual or other pseudonyms 
of the same individual. 
Credential was first brought by D. Chaum in [18], provid-
ing access with pseudonyms and transferability of a creden-
tial from one pseudonym to another. Chaum and Evertse 
19] described a cut-and-choose R S A based credential mech-
anism. A n online semi-trusted third party has to be involved 
in all transactions. Damgard [23] published another creden-
tial mechanism based on multiparty computation protocol. 
L. Chen [20] proposed an efficient one-show practical DL-
based blind signature credential system. Camenisch et. al. 
14] proposed a practical anonymous credential system, and 
introduced an effective means of preventing users from shar-
ing credentials by all-or-nothing non-transferability. A user 
allows another party to use anyone of its credentials once, 
the party can take over its identity and all its credentials. 
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Off-double-spending test and optional global anonymity re-
vocation were first put into the system. 
In [20]，she used blind signature to obtain a one-time creden-
tial which was characterized by transferability. Transferabil-
ity means that a credential associated with that organization 
A can be shown to organization B while two pseudonyms in 
the two organizations are different and unlinkable. However, 
if an individual wants to hide up organization A in a num-
ber of legitimate organizations, traditional blind signature 
cannot achieve so. 
Using blind S A G signature, there are some desirable features 
for protecting privacy of the organizations. In some cases, 
for instance, a user may want to show that he has visa-free 
nationality when it immigrates into a country. However, he 
prevents the immigrant officer to seek any information on his 
nationality while he can enter the country without a visa. A 
credential made by a blind S A G signature will become useful 
in this case. Due to the signer-ambiguity, the immigrant offi-
cer has no idea on which country he comes from. Meanwhile, 
the issuer cannot know the purpose of the passport. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
To start with, we briefly introduced spontaneous anonymous 
group cryptography concept and its key features. Spontane-
ity can bring about anonymity to many practical commercial 
applications as more people are aware of their privacy during 
transactions. Besides, the idea of multi-party can be imple-
mented by threshold S A G cryptography such that a signature 
or ciphertext can be generated by t-out-of-n group members. 
In our thesis, we introduce a modular construction of the sig-
nature using any S A G signature and blind signature. Blind 
sag signature is a novel notion of combining two crypto-
graphic paradigms: blind signature and S A G signature. It 
inherits special properties from two paradigms, which may 
be combined to form a new feature. The security relies on the 
security of both signatures in the literature. Blindness and 
signer-ambiguity are maintained. Unforgeability is proven to 
be secure if each component, TPoK, is secure against parallel 
one-more unforgery in random oracle model. 
The signature is suitable to develop applications requiring 
privacy and untraceability. Some application protocols, e.g. 
information retrieval and credential systems. 
Blind S A G still has rooms to improve in many ways. For 
69 
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 70 
example, one of the building blocks, S A G signature, grows 
with the number of user in the public key set in size. Many 
researchers are doing their best to improve the situation to 
make it more practical. Another building block, blind sig-
nature, the security of some schemes are questioned. Schnorr 
blind signature unforgeability relies on the ROS-problem which 
was brought by Schnorr [66]. Wagner [73] suggested a subex-
ponential time algorithm to solve such problem in certain 
types of finite field. Many theoretical and algorithmic re-
searches are still open for more discussions. 
Some other variants, partial blind S A G signature can be built 
in a similar way. It can be useful for some applications which 
require additional information putting inside a signature. For 
example, expiry date for individual signature can be put in 
the signature. Certain untraceability may be lost in these 
cases. These applications are still in progress. 
Further, the concept of spontaneity can be introduced into 
many cryptographic areas, e.g. key-exchange, oblivious trans-
fer and etc. S A G may become a mainstream of research areas 
in the future. 
Appendix A 
Paper derived from this thesis 
Tony K. Chan, Karyin Fung, Joseph K. Liu, Victor K. Wei, 
Blind Spontaneous Anonymous Signature for A d Hoc Group, 
Accepted for publication, The 1st European Workshop on Se-
curity m Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks (ESAS2004), L N C S ’ 
Springer-Verlag, 2004. 
Acceptance Rate: 27% 
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